been undertaken, particularly studies of the effects of long-standing regulations such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. Yet program evaluation research has been remarkably scarce relative to the overall volume of environmental policy decisions made at the state and federal level, as well as relative to the amount of evaluation research found in other fields, such as medicine, education, or transportation safety. A renewed and greatly expanded commitment to program evaluation of environmental policy would help move environmental decisionmaking closer to an evidence-based practice.
I. The Role of Program Evaluation in Environmental Policy
To look at this issue closely, it is useful first to define the role that program evaluation can play in policy deliberation and decisionmaking, distinguishing evaluation from other types of analysis, including risk assessment, cost-effectiveness analysis, and cost-benefit analysis. While reliance on these other types of analysis has greatly expanded over the past several decades, most of these other forms of analysis take place before decisions are made. Relatively little analysis takes place after decisions have been made and implemented, which is when program evaluation occurs. Yet anyone who takes analysis and deliberation seriously before decisions are made should also take seriously the need for research after decisions are made.
Because the overarching purpose behind environmental policies is to improve environmental conditions-and often thereby to improve human health-program evaluation can identify whether specific policies are serving this purpose and whether they are having other kinds of effects, such as reducing environmental inequities, imposing economic costs, or promoting or inhibiting technological change. In this section, we show how program evaluation research fits into the policy process and serves an important role in environmental decisionmaking.
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A. Environmental Policymaking and Implementation
The policy process begins with the recognition of a potential environmental problem and a response by the policymaker, often the legislature. 3 The response typically takes the form of a statute imposing requirements on industry or delegating authority to a regulatory agency, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. These agencies then create additional, more specific regulations or develop other programs to achieve legislative goals. At the federal level, for example, environmental and natural resources agencies promulgate hundreds of new regulations each year.
Regulations vary not only in their overall stringency and deadlines for compliance, but also in terms of the type of policy instrument upon which they rely. For example, technologybased instruments regulate the precise actions that regulated entities must take, while performance instruments instead compel the achievement of a specified outcome using whatever technologies or processes regulated entities choose. Performance-based regulation can take the form of requirements that all facilities achieve uniform outcomes, or they can follow a marketbased approach that allows regulated entities to average or trade in outcomes such as emissions levels. Alternatively, information-based regulatory instruments require that organizations report information to the government or the public, while management-based instruments require that regulated entities develop a planning process or put in place a management system for addressing regulatory problems.
Policy implementation also involves choices beyond the design of standards. It can include education, licensing, and grant programs. It also can include the selection of enforcement or other strategies to ensure compliance with policies. Regulatory agencies must make decisions about how they will target firms for enforcement: (a) randomly, (b) in reaction to complaints, (c) based on past history, (d) based on size or other criteria related to the regulatory problem to be solved, or (e) some combination of these or other factors. Moreover, agency inspectors can be instructed to approach their work in an adversarial manner-that is, going "by the book" and issuing citations for any violations found-or in a more cooperative manner that seeks to encourage regulated entities to solve problems and come into compliance without a heavy use of punishment. 4 Regulatory policies are adopted and then implemented and enforced to change the behavior of a class of businesses or individuals. The ultimate aim of policymaking and implementation is to create incentives for individuals and firms to change their behavior in ways that will solve the problems that motivated the adoption of public policy in the first place. If a policy works properly, the behavioral change it induces will in turn result in the desired changes in environmental conditions, public health, or other outcomes. A basic diagram of the environmental policy process is provided in Figure 1 . 
B. Prospective Analysis of Environmental Policy
Empirical analysis can usefully inform several stages of the policy process. During the policymaking and implementation stages, analysis can inform deliberation and decisionmaking about whether anything should be done to address an environmental problem and, if so, what set of policy instruments or strategies should be used. Currently, there are several different analytical methods used extensively during policymaking and implementation, including risk assessment, cost-effectiveness analysis, and benefit-cost analysis. 5 Each type of analysis is used prospectively to inform the deliberative process leading up to policy decisions.
Risk assessment characterizes the health or ecological risks associated with exposure to pollution or other hazardous environmental substances or conditions. 6 It seeks to identify the causal relationships between exposure to specific environmental hazards and specific health or ecological conditions. As such, risk assessment seeks to provide a scientific basis for understanding the potential range of benefits that can be attained from policies that aim to reduce exposure to environmental hazards.
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Benefit-cost analysis seeks to help policymakers identify the benefits and costs of specific environmental policies and implementation strategies. It compares different policy or implementation alternatives based on their net benefits-that is, total benefits minus total costs.
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Such analysis is usually conducted in advance of policymaking to try to identify regulatory options that will be the most efficient. 9 As such, benefit-cost analysis usually leads to estimates of expected net benefits from different alternatives.
Cost-effectiveness analysis seeks to identify the lowest cost means of achieving a specific goal. 10 Unlike benefit-cost analysis, which compares alternatives in terms of both costs and benefits, cost-effectiveness analysis compares alternatives simply in terms of how much they cost to achieve a given goal-regardless of whether there will be positive net benefits from achieving this goal.
EPA's regulation phasing out lead in gasoline in the 1980s illustrates the respective roles of risk-assessment, benefit-cost analysis, and cost-effectiveness analysis. Risk assessment helped demonstrate the connection between lead exposure and cognitive development in children under the age of six, as well as demonstrated that adults suffer health consequences from lead exposure through increased blood pressure. Benefit-cost analysis quantified and monetized the benefits of 7 Risk assessment is not exclusively a scientific enterprise, however, as it often involves making certain policy judgments for which public deliberation may be appropriate. avoiding the health effects indicated by the risk assessment as well as the costs of complying with the lead phase-down. In the end, the benefit-cost analysis in this regulatory proceeding showed benefits in excess of three times the cost of compliance, a finding that encouraged more rapid implementation of the phase-down rule. Finally cost-effectiveness analysis suggested that costs of compliance would be greatly reduced if refineries could average their reductions over time or across facilities, through what was known as the lead trading and banking program.
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As in the lead phase-down regulation, risk assessment and economic analysis of costs and benefits are typically used prospectively in the regulatory process, to aid legislatures and regulatory agencies in policy making. The prospective use of these analytic techniques has expanded greatly in the past 20 years due to 2 developments: evolving professional practices and executive orders mandating economic analysis under certain conditions. These executive orders, which call for such analysis preceding the adoption of new federal regulations that are anticipated to impose $100 million or more in annual compliance costs, have existed under every administration since Ronald Reagan. 12 In the wake of these orders, government agencies have developed detailed guidance for conducting the required analyses. 
C. Retrospective Analysis: Program Evaluation of Environmental Policy
In contrast to the prospective use of risk assessment and benefit-cost analysis, program evaluation occurs retrospectively, as it seeks to determine the impact of a chosen policy or implementation strategy after it has been adopted. For example, MIT economist Michael
Greenstone recently evaluated the effect of the Clean Air Act on sulfur dioxide concentrations, basing his analysis on nearly twenty years of government data collected after the Act was originally passed.
14 Under the Clean Air Act, EPA designated certain counties as "nonattainment" with respect to ambient air quality standards for SO 2 . Counties designated as "nonattainment" were subject to more stringent regulations with regard to air pollution than counties that were designated in "attainment." The data analyzed by Greenstone showed that sulfur dioxide concentrations fell more rapidly in non-attainment counties after regulation than in attainment counties. Some of these outcomes are the ones the policy was intended to achieve, such as improvements in human health or the biodiversity of an ecosystem. However, program evaluation research can also consider other effects, such as whether a policy has had unintended or undesirable 
II. Methods of Program Evaluation
The goal of program evaluation is to ascertain the causal effect of a program on one or more outcomes, that is, the change in outcomes that would not have occurred but for the program. Even if an environmental policy is correlated with a particular environmental or social outcome, this does not necessarily mean that there is a causal relationship between the policy initiative and the change in outcomes. By using state-of-the-art evaluation methods, however, researchers can isolate the effects of specific policy interventions and thereby inform environmental decisionmaking.
Program evaluation methods aim to identify the causal impact of a treatment on an outcome or outcomes. In the field of environmental policy, the treatment will often include For each treatment to be evaluated, the researcher must obtain reliable measures of outcomes. Outcome measures used in evaluations of environmental policies can include measures of facility or firm environmental performance (for example, emissions of pollutants, energy use); human health impacts (such as days of illness or mortality or morbidity rates); or overall environmental impacts (such as acres of wetland or ambient air quality). When the ultimate outcome of concern cannot be directly measured, proxies must be used to assess the impact of a policy. For example, if one wants to measure the effectiveness of a program designed to reduce risk from exposure to toxic chemicals, the ultimate outcome of interest would be health effects from toxics. But measuring the health effects that stem from toxic emissions is complicated. Toxic emissions translate to different concentrations in the air and water based on geographic and geologic factors. Exposure to these concentrations varies based on age, activity levels, and other factors. The health effects of such exposure also can vary with age and current health status, among other factors. Even though this complexity may sometimes make it infeasible to measure directly the impact of a program on health, it will often be possible to assess the impact on some other measurable proxy for health risk, such as toxic emissions or ambient concentrations.
A. Isolating the Causal Effects of Treatments on Outcomes
The goal of program evaluation is to go beyond simple correlation to estimate the causal effect of the treatment on the outcomes selected for study. A treatment and outcome may be correlated, but the treatment can properly be said to be effective only if it has a causal effect on How can researchers establish a causal link between policies and outcomes? In an ideal (but completely imaginary) world, the researcher would be able to manipulate policies and observe resulting outcomes, almost as in a chemistry experiment. For example, ideally the research would be able to designate a county as "non-attainment," subject facilities in that county to more stringent regulations, and observe the sulfur dioxide concentrations that result. Then the ideal researcher would travel back in time, and replay history only this time the areas would be designated as "attainment" and facilities would not be subject to the more stringent regulations.
If the researcher could actually observe both sets of outcomes for each county (that is, the level of sulfur dioxide concentrations in each with and without the non-attainment regulations), then the causal effect of the program would be a straightforward difference between these concentration levels.
Of course, the problem of causal inference arises because researchers cannot travel back in time and reassign counties from non-attainment to attainment and observe the resulting difference in concentrations. In reality, researchers never observe both potential outcomes for any given area. At any single point in time, the researcher can only observe the concentration levels of regulated areas, given that they were regulated, and the pollution levels for nonregulated areas, given that they were not regulated. The challenge for program evaluation researchers is to use observable data to obtain valid estimates of the inherently unobservable difference in potential outcomes between the treatment and nontreatment (or control) groups.
B. Methods for Drawing Causal Inferences
How can researchers meet this challenge and draw reliable inferences about the causal effects of environmental policies? 34 If possible, the best approach would be to conduct a policy experiment and rely on random assignment of the treatment. If regulated entities subject to a treatment are assigned at random, then other factors that determine potential outcomes are also likely to be randomly distributed between the treatment and the control group. For example, with random assignment, there should not be systematic differences in the treatment and control groups in terms of such things as industry characteristics, size of firms, or publicly traded versus privately held ownership. In the case of random assignment, any differences in outcomes between the two groups of entities could be attributed to the treatment.
True random experimental designs are rare, if not entirely nonexistent, in environmental policy. Regulation, voluntary program participation, and other treatments of interest are almost never randomly assigned. Instead, regulatory status is frequently determined by factors that also correlate with potential outcomes-such as the size of the facility, the facilities' pollution levels, and the age of the facility. For environmental policy analysis, researchers will generally be forced to use observational study designs, which are also referred to as quasi-experimental 34 A comprehensive answer to the question is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper. An alternative statistical technique would be to use a matching estimator. For each observation that is subject to the treatment (such as an industrial facility subject to a regulation) the researcher finds a "matching" observation that is not subject to the treatment. To illustrate, let us return to the hypothetical Massachusetts regulation. To implement a matching estimator in this case, the researcher would take each facility in Massachusetts and find a facility in Connecticut of the same size. The researcher would then calculate the difference in pollution levels for the Massachusetts facility and its matching facility in Connecticut. The average of these differences for all Massachusetts plants is the average effect of the regulation on pollution.
Finding a "match" is relatively easy when there is only one confounder (size of the plant in our example). But what if it is important to control not just for size, but also for age of the facility and socio-economic characteristics of the community, such as the percent employed in manufacturing, population density, median household income, and so forth? To employ a matching estimator in this case, for each facility in Massachusetts the research would need to identify a facility in Connecticut of the same size, age, and with the same socio-economic characteristics. This may not be possible. This problem is often referred to as the "curse of dimensionality" because the number of dimensions (characteristics) on which facilities must be matched is large. One estimation technique that avoids the curse of dimensionality is matching on the propensity score. 37 The propensity score is simply the probability of being treated conditional on the control variables. Observations are then matched on the basis of their propensity to receive treatment, rather than on each individual control variable. In his study of the Clean Air Act, Greenstone also used matching on the propensity score to assess the effect on likelihood that each county would be designated "non-attainment" based on the control variables.
Then counties were matched based on this likelihood of treatment. The average difference between changes in treated counties' sulfur dioxide concentrations and the changes in their corresponding match was the estimated causal effect of the Clean Air Act's nonattainment regulations.
Regression and matching estimates assume that all of the confounders are observable.
However, there are frequently cases when there are unobservable factors that are correlated with the treatment as well as potential outcomes. For example, facilities whose managers have a strong personal commitment to the environment may be more likely to participate in certain types of treatment, such as voluntary or so-called "beyond compliance" programs established by government agencies. However, the managers' commitment, which will likely be unobservable to the researcher, is also likely to be correlated with the facility's environmental performance regardless of participation in the program. 38 When there are unobservable confounders, standard regression and matching estimators will fail to provide a fully valid estimate of the causal effect of the treatment. In voluntary programs, for example, an ordinary regression estimate will be biased because it will be showing not only the effect of the voluntary program but also the effect of managers' personal commitment to the environment, without being able to separate the level of impact of the two causal factors.
In such cases, alternative estimation strategies need to be used. An estimator known as the differences-in-differences estimator can yield a valid estimate of causal effects if the unobservable differences between the treated and nontreated entities remain constant over time.
For example, imagine that the researcher has data on two sets of facilities: one set that participates in a voluntary environmental program and one that does not. However, these two sets of facilities do not have identical indicators of environmental performance before the program is created. In fact, suppose the facilities that participate in the program have, on average, lower pollution levels even before participation. This is depicted graphically in Figure 3 on page 03. It is clear from the figure that it would be incorrect to characterize the difference in environmental performance after the program as the causal effect of the regulation, because some of that difference existed before program came into existence. The differences-in-differences estimator assumes that, in the absence of treatment, the difference in environmental performance As noted, Figure 3 assumes that the unobservable differences have remained constant over time, but at times there may be good reason to think that they did not. Similarly, the differences-in-differences estimator requires data on at least two time periods --one pretreatment and one post-treatment --which sometimes do not exist for environmental policies. In either of these situations, alternative estimation methods will be required.
One frequently used estimation technique in such circumstances is the instrumental variables method. To illustrate how this method works, return to the example of a voluntary program where participation is determined, in part, by facility managers' personal commitment to the environment, something which we assume is generally unobservable to the researcher. For sake of illustration, imagine that the regulatory agency administering the voluntary program sent letters inviting facilities to participate and did so to a completely random sample of facilities.
Further, assume that, on average, facilities that receive the letter are more likely to participate than facilities that do not receive the letter, but that the correspondence between receipt of the letter and participation is not perfect. In other words, some facilities that receive the letter do not participate and some facilities that do not receive a letter nonetheless choose to participate. In such a circumstance, the participation decision is not randomly assigned and traditional statistical estimates of the effect of participation on outcome measures will be biased by the unobservable differences between participants and nonparticipants. What the instrumental variables estimator would do is capitalize on the fact that the government agency randomly assigned facilities to receive the invitation letter. In other words, some set of facilities would participate if they received a letter and would not participate if they did not receive a letter. 39 For these facilities 39 In the parlance of the instrumental variables literature, these facilities are labeled compliers. This contrasts with always-takers (facilities that would have participated regardless of whether or not they received the letter), never takers (facilities that would not have participated regardless of whether they received the letter), and defiers (facilities that would have participated if they did not receive a letter, but would not have participated if they did only, participation would be randomly assigned, because the letters were randomly sent. The statistical technique of instrumental variables estimation could isolate the effect of participation for those whose participation decisions were determined by whether they received a letter.
While the preceding discussion only briefly highlights the primary methods for estimating causal effects, it is clear that these methods are fairly well developed and available for use in evaluating the impacts of environmental policies. Indeed researchers have already used these methods to evaluate some environmental policies and programs. Yet other environmental programs remain significantly under-investigated. It is important to encourage more research using these kinds of methods so that reliable inferences can be drawn about the causal effects of environmental policies.
C. Data Availability and Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies
All of the program evaluation methods we have reviewed depend on valid and reliable data on environmental outcomes and other non-policy determinants of environmental outcomes Much of the data collected on environmental performance are built into the regulations themselves. For example, researchers have data on releases of toxic chemicals available from the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI); however, these data are available only for facilities that are subject to TRI regulations and only for the years during which TRI has been in effect. Similarly, data are reported by regulated facilities on their air emissions, water discharges, and hazardous waste generation, but these data exist only for the facilities that are regulated under the relevant statutes and for the years in which the regulations have been in effect. This close connection between data and regulation necessarily limits researchers' ability to evaluate the effects of these regulations as a treatment, because the mandated data are not available for unregulated facilities (the control group). However, these data can be used to evaluate the impact of other policies (such as voluntary programs or enforcement strategies) by comparing the outcomes for regulated firms subject to the treatment with outcomes for other regulated firms not subject to the treatment.
There are some instances where longitudinal data are available. Yet often these data have to do with ambient environmental conditions (such as air quality), and it is extremely difficult to pinpoint the effects of specific policy changes using these indicators. In most cases, it is impossible to use ambient data to identify the effects on individual firms or facilities.
Researchers seeking longitudinal data on individual facility performance have often used TRI data because they are readily accessible for many (but by no means all) regulated firms since the late 1980s. But these data have their limitations too. Most obviously, they do not capture all the impacts firms have on the environment, as the data only cover releases of certain toxic pollutants. Furthermore, these data are self-reported, not adjusted for risk, and only reported by facilities that exceed the established reporting thresholds. 43 All these factors can affect the valid use of TRI data as outcome measures for policy evaluation.
Researchers have sometimes used other measures of environmental impacts, such as total suspended solids levels or biological oxygen demand in water 44 or levels of water usage. 45 However, obtaining these measures has generally required intensive collection efforts which have so far limited the use of these data. To a large extent, the future of program evaluation in environmental policy will therefore be married to the future of environmental reporting and performance measurement. 46 This remains an important area for future research and funding.
III. The Future of Program Evaluation of Environmental Policy
The idea of subjecting policies to program evaluation research is certainly not new. At about the same time that environmental issues emerged on the federal policy agenda in the 1960s
and early 1970s, the federal government also began to emphasize the use of performance A more recent concern is that government may begin to restrict access to such data due to concerns about its potential use by terrorists. For now at least, TRI data continue to be publicly available despite these concerns. 44 In addition to requiring good metrics on outcomes (that is, environmental performance) for the treatment and control groups, policy evaluation also requires data on other potential determinants of environmental performance. These include key variables describing the regulated entities (such as production processes, production levels, or market characteristics). government programs begin to use this tool to evaluate whether they are resulting in significant progress toward public goals. 51 Just as executive orders on the ex ante use of economic analysis for major regulations have given greater prominence to those analytic tools within government agencies, GPRA and PART may increase demand within environmental and natural resources agencies for program evaluation research.
Finally, while data limitations remain the greatest barrier to program evaluation in the environmental field, these data are increasingly available online and agencies are taking other steps that make it easier to use these data for evaluation research. 52 While EPA has collected data on air emissions, water discharges, hazardous waste generation, and toxics releases for several decades, in the past these data were collected and maintained separately by the respective program offices within the agency. As a result, each office generated its own metadata and, importantly, its own numbering system for identifying facilities. Thus, the same facility was assigned an AIRS (Aerometric Information Retrieval System) identifier for the air office, a Permit Compliance System identifier for the water office, and a TRI identifier for the office of information. Researchers hoping to combine data from more than one source were forced to match facilities by hand-usually by name and address. Recently, however, EPA has instituted a common Facility Registry System (FRS) identifier. This identifier has been added to all existing EPA databases, allowing researchers more easily to match data on a facility from multiple sources.
Another recent development that is likely to improve environmental policy evaluation is 
Conclusion
Program evaluation research provides valuable information for policy decisionmaking.
Decision makers in state and federal regulatory agencies, legislatures, and other oversight bodies (such as OMB) need to design and implement policies that work to achieve public goals. With information from retrospective evaluations of policies, policymakers will be better able to determine what policies to adopt (and how to design them) in the future. Policy evaluation research can also help identify ways to change existing policies to make them more beneficial. other areas like medicine or education that have more fully adopted principles of evidence-based decisionmaking. The value of evidence-based practice is only made more compelling when one acknowledges the strength of the biases that can and do affect decisionmaking.
More program evaluation research should help counteract the skeptical responses to research in the policy process. If a single study demonstrates that a program is effective or ineffective, those who are predisposed to think otherwise may be quick to dismiss the findings.
With multiple program evaluation studies on environmental policies, such dismissals will become more difficult to sustain. If several studies reach consistent results, then over time the preponderance of the empirical evidence will be more likely to affect the decisions of policymakers.
Moreover, the reality is that some regulatory officials are receptive to research that can tell them about what works and what does not work. For example, EPA has recently released a strategy document on environmental management systems that gives priority to the need for careful program evaluation of initiatives in this area. 55 Consistent with this priority, EPA has even recently sponsored research efforts on management-based strategies for improving environmental performance. 56 Only with more efforts to give priority to program evaluation research will decisionmaking over environmental policy be able to become based more on careful deliberation than on rhetorical and political contestation. It is doubtful that program evaluation research will end political conflict altogether or immunize policymakers from all error. But it can help sharpen 
